Posts Tagged ‘Natural Law’

The Skeptical Case against the UN Declaration of Human Rights / 3

August 5, 2025

“The Skeptical Case against the UN Declaration of Human Rights / 3” follows on from my previous essays:

The Skeptical Case Against Natural Law / 1

The Fallacy of Universalism / 2

Background

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 1948. Since then the number of instances of man’s inhumanity to man has increased by more than a factor of 3 and at greater than the rate of population growth  (2.5 billion in 1948 to c. 8 billion today). The Declaration has neither reduced suffering nor improved human behaviour. In fact, it has not even addressed human behaviour let alone human conflict. Data from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) shows that violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have risen in absolute terms, outpacing global population growth. and regional instability. 

Introduction

The modern concept of universal human rights is often presented as an intrinsic truth, an unassailable moral foundation upon which justice, equality, and dignity rest. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is considered a cornerstone of this ideology, purportedly designed to protect individuals from oppression and injustice. However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that the notion of human rights is a political fiction rather than an objective reality. It is not derived from natural law, nor is it an empirically observable phenomenon. Besides, natural law itself is just a fiction. Instead, its primary function is for moral posturing. It also serves as a strategic tool that sustains particular social, political, and economic structures. The UDHR, while symbolically powerful, lacks true enforcement and primarily functions as a mechanism for political justification, moral posturing, and bureaucratic self-preservation.

Here I try to articulate the philosophical inadequacy of human rights justifications, the inherent contradictions in their supposed universality, and my conclusion that the true function of the UDHR is for moral and sanctimonious posturing rather than an effective means of improving human behavior. The bottom line is that the UDHR has not done any good (reduced suffering or improved behaviour) and has done harm by justifying the concept of privileges which do not have to be earned. It is not fit for purpose.

The Philosophical Justification for Human Rights: A Fictional Construct

Human rights are often presented as pre-existing entitlements inherent to all individuals, regardless of circumstances or behavior. This idea suggests that every human being is owed certain protections and freedoms simply by virtue of existence. However, a fundamental flaw in this reasoning is that all human experiences, including the recognition or denial of rights, are entirely dependent on the behavior of others. Rights that are “realised” or “enjoyed” are always due to the magnanimity of those who have the power to spoil the party not, in fact, spoiling the party. The concept of rights existing independently of behaviour, ensured either by human enforcement or granted by those with the power to deny the right, is an abstraction rather than an observable reality. Neither the universe nor nature has any interest in this invented concept. The universe does not owe anybody anything. Real human behaviour has no interest in and pays little heed to this fantasy either. Actions taken by humans are always in response to existing imperatives for the human who is acting and not – except incidentally – for the fulfilling of the human rights of others. No burglar or murderer (or IS fanatic or Hamas imbecile) ever refrained from nefarious activities to respect the supposed rights of others. Human behaviour – the actions we actually take – are governed by the imperatives physically prevailing in our minds and bodies at the moment of action. I suggest that an imagined, artificial concept of the “rights” of others is never a significant factor either for action or for preventing action.

Several philosophical justifications have been proposed to support the existence of human rights, but none withstand critical scrutiny. The Kantian perspective, which argues that humans are ends in themselves and deserve dignity, relies on an assumption rather than an empirical foundation. The empirical evidence is, in fact, that the assumption is false. There is no objective reason why human dignity should be treated as an absolute, nor does nature provide any evidence that such dignity is an inherent property of existence. Dignity is not an attribute that carries any value in the natural world. From the slums of the world, to its war torn regions and from children dying of famine in Sudan to the homeless drug addicts of Los Angeles, the idea of inherent human dignity collapses when exposed to the realities of human existence. The utilitarian justification, which claims that human rights create stable and prosperous societies, also fails to prove its intrinsic validity; rather, it only suggests that they may be useful under certain conditions. Moreover, contractual justifications, such as those proposed by John Rawls, assert that rights arise from a hypothetical social contract. But this merely describes a proposed social convention rather than any truth or moral compulsion.

Ultimately, human rights are experienced as a result  – a consequence – of received behaviour. When enjoyed, they are experienced only because they were not violated by someone who could but didn’t. They are not objective or universal principles but merely received experience resulting from the behaviour of others, which itself is a consequence of happenstance. This reality contradicts the popular narrative that rights are universal, unearned entitlements independent of actual, individual behavior. If an individual’s experience of rights depends entirely on the recognition and actions of others, then what is commonly called a “right” is, in practice, a privilege granted by those who choose not to use their capability to ensure or their power to deny it. No child is born with any rights except those privileges afforded by its surrounding society. The blatant lie – and not just a fiction – is that children are born “equal in rights and dignity”. Compared to reality, this aspires at best to being utter rubbish. The “right” of a child to be nurtured is at the behavioural whim of the adult humans exercising power and control over the child. The “right” to property is a privilege granted by those with the power to permit, protect or deny such ownership. The “right” to not be killed is a privilege granted by those having the power to protect or the ability and the inclination to kill. The right to speak freely lasts only as long as those who can, choose not to suppress it. Incidentally, there is no country in the world which does not constrain free speech to be allowed speech. “Free speech” is distinguished by its non-existence anywhere in the world. The imaginary right of free speech has now led to the equally fanciful rights to not be offended or insulted. Good grief! No living thing has, in fact, any “right” to life. The right to live has no force when confronted by a drunken driver or an act of gross incompetence or negligence or natural catastrophes. This right to life has no practical value when life is threatened. The stark reality is that any individual enjoys the received experience of human “rights” only as long as someone else’s behaviour does not prevent it.

A lawyer friend once asked me whether it was my position that a child did not have the right not to be tortured? The answer is that the question is fatally flawed. Such a right – like every other human right – is just a fiction. The question is flawed because the realisation of any “right” (or entitlement or privilege) is itself fictional and lies in a fictional future. Not being tortured is a result of the behaviour and / or non-behaviour of others. This result is a received privilege granted to children by those in positions of power over them. Most children are protected by the adults around them provided, of course, they have a desire to protect them. The “rights” of the children are as nothing compared to the desires of the surrounding adults who have the ability to implement their desires. The reality that so many children are, in fact, mistreated and tortured is because their persecutors declined to grant them the privilege of not being tortured. Furthermore it is the actions of their persecutors which lead  – by omission or by commission – to them being tortured. In practice, having any such “right” is of no value, either for children who are not tortured or for those so unfortunate as to be subjected to vile and cruel behaviour.

Unearned rights are imaginary and they come without any cost or demand on qualifying behaviour. It is inevitable that they have zero practical value when that supposed right is under threat. A so-called right is enjoyed or violated only as a consequence of someone else’s behaviour (including lack of behaviour). The actions involved are driven by what is important for that someone else. The reality is that even every perpetrator of an atrocity has imperatives which drive his behaviour and his actions. The fictional human rights of others – declared or not – are never included among the imperatives governing his actions. They are, in fact, irrelevant to his actions. No robber or murderer or torturer ever refrained from his imperatives for the sake of someone else’s human rights. The fatal flaw in the invented concept of human rights is that real human behaviour is not considered. It is taken to be irrelevant and improvement of actual behaviour is not directly addressed at all. Real human behaviour contradicts the imaginary concept of universal, unearned rights.

The invention of  the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

The 1948 UDHR does not explicitly state any measurable objectives such as the reduction of human suffering or the improvement of human behavior. Instead, it tries to be normative. It ends up as a religious text, a moral and aspirational document, setting out principles that define the ideal treatment of individuals by states and societies as seen by guilt-ridden European eyes. By any measure the behaviour of humans towards other humans has not changed very much since WWII (or as it would seem, since we became modern humans). Human conflict and violence and suffering, even adjusted for population, has not declined since WWII. It has, in fact, increased in total volume. The UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is not linked to any mechanism that enforces its values globally. It’s success is often claimed in principle, but rarely demonstrated in impact. If the world is no less cruel, and probably crueler, after 75 years of pious global rights declarations, what exactly have these declarations achieved?

The UDHR, drafted in the aftermath of World War II, is widely regarded as a historic achievement in the pursuit of justice and equality. However, its origins and functions suggest that it was created primarily to serve political and strategic interests rather than to protect individuals from oppression. One of its primary functions was to rehabilitate the moral standing of Western nations after the atrocities of the 20th century. The Holocaust was – let us not forget – inflicted by Europeans mainly on Europeans. These are the same Europeans whose descendants claimed, and still claim, superior morals and values and civilization to the rest of the world today. The atrocities committed were not just considered allowable but they were also taken, at that time, to be desirable by the standards and values held by some of those same Europeans. To “eradicate the dregs of humanity” was considered the right thing to do in many countries. Coercive eugenics was considered moral by many in Europe. Genocide of such second-rate beings was considered scientifically sound in Europe. The Danes with their Greenlanders, the Swedes and Norwegians with their Sami are cases in point. The Swedish Institute of Race Biology was set up in the 20s and was both the inspiration and the collaborator for the German development of Racial Hygiene theories. This was not some fanatic view. It was part of the mainstream thinking in Europe at the time.

European colonisation was taken as proof of the superiority of the “European race”. The British, for whatever excuses they may make now, were the ones who, knowingly and by omission, allowed 3 – 4 million Indians to die in the Bengal Famine and demonstrated their conviction that native lives had a lower value. The atrocities by France and Belgium and Britain in their colonies in Asia and Africa were no great advertisement for their fine, sanctimonious words at the UN. The concept of “Untermensch” was not held only by the Germans then, and is far from extinct even today. Modern Europeans today commonly still believe the Roma are an inferior race, no matter what their laws may say. The virtue signaling of atonement for past sins, rather than any great surge of humanitarianism, was a key driver of the UN Declaration. Dark skinned peoples are still “Untermensch” in Eastern Europe. The continued bondage of Africans in the Middle East is still slavery in all but name. (But let us not be naive. Race is real and “racism” is alive in every country in todays Asia).

The Holocaust wasn’t some alien invasion. It was Europeans slaughtering certain other Europeans, a homegrown nightmare fueled by ideology, economic collapse, and centuries of tribal hatreds. The UDHR emerged from its ashes, drafted by an unholy coalition of victors and survivors, but its creation wasn’t pure altruism. Western nations, squirming to excuse their own complicity, which had manifested through the 20s and 30s as the wide support for national socialism, appeasement, colonial brutality, of eugenics and of looking aside, needed a moral reset. Hitler had had supporters in every European country (and across the Americas). The UDHR was a way to whitewash themselves and polish their image. A way to say, “We’re the good guys now,” while distancing themselves from the evils of the Soviets and communism. It was less about protecting individuals and more about stabilizing a world order where the West could whitewash reality and claim ethical superiority. Its lofty, sanctimonious words didn’t stop the Cold War’s proxy slaughters or decolonisation’s bloodbaths.

The Holocaust, colonial exploitation, and “war crimes” committed by European powers (victors and vanquished alike) was a massive threat to their assumed moral superiority. By establishing, and being seen to espouse, a “universal” doctrine of rights, Western leaders sought to reshape their global image and provide an ideological – but entirely fictional – justification for their continued dominance. It was sanctimonious, self-righteous and patronising. It was the European elitist’s idea of a catechism for the less enlightened world to follow blindly. After 75+ years of the UDHR, could a Holocaust happen again in Europe? Of course it could. Of course it can. Looking at Kosovo, of course it did! Wherever conflict is now taking place, whether in Gaza or Ukraine or in the Yemen or the Sudan, observing the human rights of the enemy are of no great consequence in the strategic planning of either side.

The UDHR is a pious declaration rather than a legally binding treaty, which means that nations can violate its principles without facing direct consequences. It has been repeatedly violated since the day it was written by its own authors and signatories; in Algeria (by France), in Africa and Asia by the UK, in Vietnam (by the U.S.), in Latin America and in Iraq, Syria, China, Russia and Myanmar. Countries that routinely engage in torture, mass surveillance, political repression, and genocide frequently sign human rights agreements while simultaneously disregarding their content. Ultimately behaviour is by individuals. That a loose promise by a government of a country could bind all of its people, who it does not necessarily represent, is pie in the sky. Claiming universality of values, which patently does not exist, devalues the Declaration as being delusional. The lack of enforcement renders the declaration largely symbolic, exposing the contradiction between its universal claims and its practical impotence.

The Failure of the UDHR

Despite its elevated status in international discourse, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is entirely made up and has no sound philosophical foundations. It is not observed anywhere in the natural world and lacks empirical validation as a force for reducing human suffering or curbing atrocity. Much of the legislation introduced in countries under the “Human Rights” label could have been better introduced in more appropriate local forms. I question the normative power claimed for the UDHR. I can find no way to measure, and no evidence of, the reduction of suffering or the improvement of human behaviour or the reduction of man’s inhumanity to man since the 1948 declaration. The data suggest that rights discourse has had no measurable preventative effect at all. Instead, violations remain persistent, and have only increased in severity and scale. We find that events of humans doing harm to other humans have more than kept pace with the population growth. According to the UN’s own Human Rights Violations Index and data from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), global violations have increased in absolute terms since 1948. So the bottom line is that the incidence of suffering events have increased by about a factor 3 since 1948. In 2024, the UN verified 41,370 grave violations against children in conflict zones (a 25% increase year-on-year), including 22,495 children killed, wounded, recruited, or denied aid (docs.un.org, theguardian.com). Though it only goes back some 30 years, there has never been a year where this metric has declined. The number of individual complaints lodged with the UN Human Rights Committee has reached an all‑time high, and censorship, repression, and legal harassment are more systematic than ever (universal-rights.org, ohchr.org).

Simultaneously, the human rights industry has grown unchecked. Estimates suggest over 48,000 full-time “professionals” are directly engaged globally in rights-related work, expanding at an annual rate of 5%. Including the ICC and international courts the annual budget is around $4 – 5 billion USD per year. This industry relies on crises, where its own survival depends on the perceiving of problems (real or imagined), and the illusion of progress rather than real change. If human rights issues were truly being resolved, many of these institutions would no longer be needed. They should be working towards their own irrelevance. If human rights were improving the industry ought to be shrinking – not growing at 5% per year. Success is measured not by any measure of reduction of suffering or of improving behaviour, but by how much is spent on themselves and in ensuring an increased budget for the next year. With no performance-based metric by which this sector can evaluate its own effectiveness, it measures only what it spends and the number of declarations, treaties, and reports it produces. Its expansion resembles bureaucratic self-interest more than social remedy.

Philosophically, the foundation of “universal rights” has long been contested. Jeremy Bentham dismissed natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts,” rejecting their grounding outside positive law. I take the view that law is made by society, each for, and suited to, itself. It must be grounded locally. Bottom up, not top down. Universal law as I have written about earlier is a mirage. Alasdair MacIntyre also observed that invoking rights “is like invoking witches or unicorns”, a secular invocation of metaphysical constructs without demonstrable existence (After Virtue, 1981). Historically, human rights interventions have always failed, and sometimes spectacularly, under the weight of political selectivity and cultural prejudices. Whether Rwanda or Darfur or Syria or Myanmar or Yemen, moral posturing, rather than any conflict resolution is the primary objective.

What value, then, does the UDHR have?

  • It does not constrain, since non-state actors and authoritarian regimes and even individuals  routinely ignore it without consequence.
  • It does not protect, and the areas where violations are worst (Sudan, Syria, Gaza, Yemen) are just those areas where the UDHR is devoid of respect and effectiveness.
  • It does not deter and there is no rational mechanism by which the UDHR can have any impact on the resorting to violence, the outbreak of war or the committing of mass atrocities (intentionally or not).
  • It is not universal, is seen to be skewed in its values and often rejected or ignored whenever inconvenient by cultural and political parties

The function of this industry is not, it would seem, to eliminate human rights violations, nor to reduce suffering or improve human behaviour, but to create a controlled narrative that manages public perception. By providing the illusion of accountability and reform, the human rights industry serves primarily as a panacea.

To reduce suffering or to change behaviour?

There is a glaring gap between the lofty tone of the UDHR and the reality of human behavior. The declaration does not describe how rights will be enforced. It assumes that widespread recognition of rights will somehow influence behavior. It is a hope, not a mechanism. It contains no theory of human psychology or motivation. So while the spirit of the UDHR implies a desire to reduce suffering and encourage more humane behavior, it lacks both strategy and realism in achieving that.

People are led to believe that the world is moving toward justice and equality, even as human suffering, war, and exploitation continue unabated. Human behaviour changes only when humans perceive that to change is of greater benefit than not changing. The reality is that even when actions cause collateral harm, no one refrains from his (or her) chosen actions for the purpose of respecting the imaginary rights of those who may be harmed. They may refrain for fear of punishment or retaliation or because they chose to do something else, but never for the sake of respecting imaginary rights. It is the idea of being entitled to unearned privileges which is fundamentally unsound – even sick. It is, in fact, where entitlement culture and its ills begin. If human behaviour is to be addressed it can only be done locally not with futile, pious, universal declarations. Human values are local not global. The value of human life varies from local society to local society. The drivers of human action are local, not some pious, universal fiction. Changing behaviour can only begin locally – in accordance with local values and mores.

The envelope of possible human behaviour is set by our genes and probably has not changed in 50,000 years. The quantity of bad behaviour at any given time is just the rate of bad behaviour multiplied by population. The rate of bad behaviour for dense, industrialised urban environments is no doubt different to that for hunter-gatherers. But it has been fairly constant for at least the last 5,000 years since the earliest legal codes were framed to control behaviour in societies. Even the codes of Ur-Nammu (2,100 BCE) or Hammurabi (1,750 BCE) reflect societies dealing with murder, theft, cruelty, sexual misconduct, and violence. They dealt with precisely the same behaviour that modern codes try to address. Codes of law (and law enforcement arrangements) have been used for at least 5,000 years to manage existing societies, but they have not changed the fundamentals of human behaviour at all. The crime and punishment needs for the functioning of a society rarely have any impact on fundamental human behaviour. We should note that a Code of Law and legal systems are governance tools, not human reprogramming mechanisms. They do not remove the ability or the impulse to do harm. They merely deter some with punishment, redirect some through social conditioning, and repress others with institutional force. Codes of Law constrain some unwanted behaviour and help societies to function but they do not change human behaviour. They do not even try to. Human nature itself does not evolve on civilizational timeframes.

More perniciously, the UDHR has helped cultivate a culture of entitlement divorced from merit, responsibility, or behaviour. By declaring rights as universal and unearned, it has promoted the dangerous fiction that dignity, security, and privilege are birthrights requiring no reciprocal obligation. “Being born equal in rights and dignity” is so blatant a falsehood that it puts the sincerity of the document authors in doubt. This moral dilution has eroded the foundations of duty, effort, and earned respect that once underpinned functioning societies. The bases of civic behaviour (duty, responsibility, … ) have been badly undermined.

Rather than preventing oppression, the human rights framework often provides the form, the illusion, of improvement without having any substance. This psychological function of human rights discourse benefits those in power by fostering passivity and compliance. The UDHR is used to provide a perception of actions as a means of sedating societies not for reducing suffering or improving behaviour.

Conclusion

The fiction of universal human rights is maintained not because it reflects reality but because it serves political, bureaucratic, and ideological functions. The UDHR was crafted as a tool for Western moral rehabilitation after World War II, but its lack of enforcement has rendered it a symbolic rather than a document for actions. Human rights are invoked selectively, as a political tool rather than for achieving actual improvement. Furthermore, the human rights industry sustains itself by perpetuating crises rather than resolving them, and the narrative of inevitable progress pacifies individuals rather than inspiring real change.

Since the UDHR was framed, human behaviour has not changed one iota in consequence. Human suffering has increased largely in line with population increase, but where the rate of doing harm to others has been either unaffected or made slightly worse by the declarations. Certainly the declarations have not reduced the rate of humans doing harm to humans. The bottom line is that the UDHR does not reduce suffering and it does not even address human behaviour. The UDHR, in real conditions of war, insurgency, or factional conflict is little more than a legal fiction and a moral “comfort blanket”. It survives in courtrooms, classrooms, and NGOs, but disappears from battlefields, street protests, from all large crowds and assemblies and any refugee camps.

The question, then, is not whether human rights exist in any real sense (they do not), but rather, who benefits from the perpetuation of the human rights illusion? Certainly suffering is not reduced and human behaviour is unaddressed. The primary beneficiary of the human rights industry, it seems to me, is the human rights industry.

In the long run human behaviour will change only along with local societies as they develop and will reflect the imperatives of those local societies. The global picture only emerges as a consequence as a summation of local changes. Behaviour and behavioural change cannot be imposed top down. It can only happen from the bottom up because it lies ultimately with individuals.

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The Fallacy of Universalism / 2

April 16, 2025
This is the second in the essay series which began with

The Skeptical Case Against Natural Law / 1

 
The Fallacy of Universalism

The 20th century’s obsession with universalism – the notion that humanity can be bound by shared values, laws, or moral standards – was a profound misstep, rooted in shaky philosophical foundations and doomed by practical realities. From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 to global institutions like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and International Criminal Court (ICC), universalism promised a unified moral order to transcend cultural and national divides. Yet this pursuit was not just misguided; it was built on false premises that ignored the inherent diversity of humans and their societies. Far from fostering harmony, universalism sought to suppress the biological and social variety that ensures humanity’s resilience and vitality. Driven partly by European guilt after World War II and cloaked in virtue-signaling, it misunderstood human nature and curbed the freedoms it claimed to champion. This post argues that universalism lacks any coherent philosophical grounding – relying on fictions like Natural Law – and fails practically by imposing unworkable frameworks that stifle diversity’s strength. Societies thrive when free to forge their own values, provided they do no harm to others, rendering universalism both unnecessary and counterproductive.

Shaky Foundations

Universalism’s most glaring flaw is its lack of a sound philosophical basis. Proponents often invoke Natural Law – the idea that universal moral truths are inherent in human nature or discoverable through reason – as a cornerstone. This concept, tracing back to thinkers like Aquinas and Locke, assumes a shared essence that dictates right and wrong across all societies. Yet Natural Law is a fiction, a construct that crumbles under scrutiny. As argued in my earlier post, it presupposes a uniformity of human values that history and anthropology disprove. If moral truths were truly universal, why do societies differ so starkly on fundamental questions – life, justice, freedom? The Aztec practice of human sacrifice was as rational to them as modern human rights are to the West; both reflect context, not eternal truths. Natural Law’s claim to universality ignores that reason itself is shaped by culture, environment, and survival needs, yielding no singular moral code.

The contradiction is evident in universalism’s own failures. If values like “do not kill” were innate, as Natural Law suggests, atrocities like the Rwandan genocide or the Holocaust would not have mobilized thousands of perpetrators acting with conviction. That thousands of Islamic fundamentalists believe that killing infidels is the right and proper thing to do makes a mockery of ideas of universal morality. Universalist institutions like the ICC assert that crimes such as genocide “shock the conscience of humanity,” implying a shared moral compass. Yet the very occurrence of these acts – often justified as cultural or political imperatives – exposes the absence of such a compass. All the most heinous, inhuman acts in the world – as considered by some – are all committed by other humans who have quite different values. Values are not universal; they are contingent, forged in the crucible of specific societies. To claim otherwise is to project one’s own biases as truth, a philosophical sleight-of-hand that Natural Law enables but cannot sustain.

Other philosophical defenses of universalism fare no better. Kant’s categorical imperative – act only according to maxims you would have as universal law – assumes a rational consensus that doesn’t exist. Societies prioritize different ends: Japan values collective harmony, while the US exalts individual liberty. Neither can universalize its maxim without negating the other. Human rights, another universalist pillar, rest on the same shaky ground. The UDHR’s assertion of inalienable rights – life, equality – sounds noble but lacks grounding in any objective reality. Rights are not discovered; they are invented, reflecting the priorities of their creators (post-war Western elites). When Saudi Arabia or China rejects aspects of the UDHR, they’re not defying reason but asserting their own rational frameworks. Universalism’s philosophical poverty lies in its refusal to admit this pluralism, insisting instead on a unity that suppresses the diversity of human thought.

Over the past three centuries, universalism has masked control as moral duty. Colonial powers invoked civilization to plunder India and Africa, erasing diverse traditions under a universalist banner. The ICC’s African focus continues this, imposing Western justice while sparing Western crimes, proving universalism’s selectivity. Such interventions violate the principle of ‘do no harm,’ curbing societies’ freedom to differ unless they tangibly harm others.

This suppression is not just academic – it’s a curb on freedom. Diversity in values allows societies to experiment, adapt, and thrive in unique ways. Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness metric defies Western materialism yet fosters stability. Indigenous Australian kinship laws prioritize community over individualism, sustaining cultures for millennia. Forcing these societies to align with a universal standard – whether Natural Law or human rights – erases their agency, imposing conformity under the guise of morality. Philosophically, universalism fails because it denies the reality of human variation, mistaking difference for defect.

Why Universalism

The 20th-century love affair with universalism was more emotional than philosophical, driven by European guilt after World War II. The Holocaust, colonial atrocities, and global wars left Europe’s moral credibility in tatters. Once-proud imperial powers faced a reckoning, with their Enlightenment ideals exposed as hollow, by gas chambers, induced famines and bombed cities. The UDHR, drafted under UN auspices, was less a global consensus than a European attempt to reclaim moral ground. Its language – steeped in Western liberalism – framed rights as universal truths, ignoring dissenting voices from post-colonial or non-Western states. Ratification was pushed as necessary evidence of a country being part of the new civilised world order. Countries like India or Saudi Arabia ratified it with caveats, revealing the myth of unity. This virtue-signaling extended to institutions like the UN and ICC, which promised a new world order while sidestepping Europe’s complicity in creating the old one.

Universalism’s roots lie in ancient dreams of unity – Stoic cosmopolitanism, Christian salvation – but these were aspirational, not coercive. The Enlightenment and colonial eras turned universalism into a tool of control, with Natural Law as a flimsy excuse. But these fictions fail to bridge the diversity of human values.

This guilt-driven push was not about understanding humanity but about control by retaking the moral high ground. By proclaiming universal values, Europe (and later the West) sought to redefine the global moral landscape in its image. The ICC’s focus on African states – over 80% of its cases – while sparing Western actions in Iraq or Afghanistan, echoes colonial “civilizing” missions. Universalism became a tool to judge and intervene, not to unite. Its philosophical weakness – lacking a basis beyond Western dogma – made it ripe for such misuse, cloaking power in moral rhetoric.

Universalism is unworkable

Beyond its philosophical flaws, universalism fails practically by imposing frameworks that ignore the diversity of human societies. The complexity of aligning multiple nations under one standard grows exponentially with each participant, as vetoes and competing interests stall progress. The UN Security Council exemplifies this: a single veto from the US, France, the UK, Russia or China can paralyze action, as seen in Syria’s decade-long crisis. The WTO’s Doha Round, launched in 2001, remains deadlocked after 24 years, with 164 members unable to reconcile their priorities. The ICC’s record is equally dismal – 10 convictions in over two decades, none involving major powers like the US or India, who opt out entirely. These failures stem from a simple truth: the more diverse the players, the harder it is to find, let alone enforce, a universal rule.

Contrast this with bilateral agreements, which are exponentially simpler. A nation negotiates with one partner at a time, tailoring terms to mutual benefit without navigating a global gauntlet. Since the 1990s, bilateral trade deals have surged – over 300 globally by 2025 – while multilateral talks languish. The USMCA replaced NAFTA precisely because three nations could align faster than 34 under earlier pan-American proposals. Even security pacts, like India-Japan defense agreements, thrive on bilateral trust, not universal ideals. The math is clear: for “N” countries, managing “N-1” bilateral relationships is far less chaotic than wrestling with “N!” (N factorial) potential interactions in a multilateral arena. Like Rome’s Pax Romana, modern universalism falters when imposed, breeding resistance not unity. Bilateral cooperation, rooted in mutual respect, proves more viable

Universalism’s practical flaw is its denial of sovereignty. Societies function best when free to set their own rules, as long as they do no harm to others. Iceland’s secular egalitarianism and Saudi Arabia’s religious conservatism coexist peacefully because neither imposes its values across borders. When harm occurs—say, overfishing causing dwindling fish stocks, bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation among the parties involved can address it far better than by demanding ideological conformity. Universalist institutions, by contrast, breed resentment by judging internal practices. The UN’s human rights sanctions on Iran or the ICC’s warrants against African leaders provoke defiance, not compliance, as societies reject external moralizing.

The Strength of Difference

Individuals being different is humanity’s greatest asset, biologically and socially. Genetically, variation ensures survival (of the species though not of the unfit individual), allowing species adaptation to environmental shifts – a too narrow genetic spread would go extinct. Socially, this diversity manifests in the myriad ways societies organize themselves. The Maasai’s nomadic communalism sustains them in arid lands, while Singapore’s meritocratic discipline drives its prosperity. These systems, often at odds with universalist ideals, prove that cohesion requires no global standard. The “do no harm” principle respects this, allowing societies to be “unusual” so long as they avoid cross-border damage. When Japan’s whaling sparks debate, the issue is ecological impact, not moral offense. This approach fosters peace through mutual restraint, not forced unity.

Universalism’s attempt to erase the “we/them” dichotomy is both futile and destructive. Group identity – cultural, national – fuels cohesion and innovation. The “brotherhood of man” sounds noble but ignores that brotherhood privileges some over others. To eliminate “we/them” is to strip societies of their freedom to differ, demanding a homogeneity that negates diversity’s strength. The backlash – rising nationalism, skepticism of global bodies – reflects a reclaiming of this freedom.

Conclusion: Beyond Universalism

The 20th-century chase for universalism was a flawed response to a troubled era, rooted in European guilt and philosophical fiction. Natural Law and its offspring – human rights, global justice – lack grounding in the reality of human diversity. Practically, universalism’s complex frameworks collapse under the weight of competing sovereignties, while bilateral solutions prove nimbler and more respectful of difference. Societies thrive when free to forge their own paths, bound only by the duty to do no harm. Humanity’s strength lies not in sameness but in variation – genetic, cultural, ideological. By embracing this, we can foster a world of cooperation without conformity, where diversity, not universalism, ensures our resilience and freedom.

In order of difficulty in organising any field of activity, national is simpler than bilateral which is, in turn, simpler than multi-lateral and international –  in that sequence. It seems the world was bitten by the international bug during the 20th century, but has now realised it has gone too far and is now gingerly drawing back because international bodies have largely proven ineffective, bureaucratic, or politically manipulated.

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The Skeptical Case Against Natural Law / 1

March 19, 2025

For many years I have struggled with finding the words to express my instinctive feelings against attempts to apply “universal” principles across all humans and which suppress human individuality. I have often tried  – usually without much success – to explain my dislike for concepts such as universal morality, Natural law, universal rights, unearned rights as entitlements and entitlements independent of behaviour. I am coming to the conclusion that my objections to, and dislike of, these concepts are essentially philosophical. Explanations of my objections need, I think, to be couched in philosophical terms.

I try to address these (again) in this series of essays.

Natural Law is often presented as a foundational principle governing human morality, law, and rights, claiming to be a universal standard of justice inherent in human nature. However, a closer examination reveals that Natural Law is not an empirical reality but a constructed ideological tool. It emerges only when different societies with distinct laws interact, and its purpose has historically been to justify the imposition of one society’s norms over another. The absence of empirical evidence for Natural Law, combined with its theological underpinnings and political motivations, renders it an unconvincing framework for understanding human morality and governance. Instead, morality is best understood as an emergent property of individual human values, varying across cultures, historical periods, and personal experiences. Here I try to explore the philosophical, historical, and empirical reasons why Natural Law fails as a legitimate concept and why morality must be recognized as subjective rather than universal.

The Absence of Empirical Evidence for Natural Law

If Natural Law were a genuine feature of human existence, we would expect to observe universal moral principles across all societies and cultures. However, anthropological and historical research reveals no such universality. While there are commonalities in human behavior – such as cooperation and conflict resolution – these vary significantly in their expression. For example, concepts of justice, property, and individual rights differ widely between societies. The idea that certain rights are inherent to all human beings is not supported by empirical observation but rather by ideological assertions.

Human history is filled with examples of societies that have organized themselves around vastly different moral and legal systems. From the caste-based hierarchy of ancient India to the communal property arrangements of indigenous tribes, moral codes are deeply context-dependent. Even within the same society, moral norms evolve over time, reflecting changes in economic conditions, technological advancements, and cultural shifts. This variability directly contradicts the claim that a singular, natural moral order governs human behavior.

The lack of empirical confirmation for Natural Law relegates it to the realm of metaphysical speculation. If Natural Law cannot be observed or tested, then it is indistinguishable from theological doctrine. It becomes a belief system rather than a demonstrable reality, making it no different from religious faith. This reliance on unprovable assertions undermines its credibility as a foundation for legal or moral theory.

Natural Law as a Tool of Domination

Natural Law does not emerge in isolated societies but only when different societies with conflicting rules interact. Historically, it has been invoked to justify the imposition of one society’s rules over another, often under the guise of a higher moral authority. Colonialism, religious expansion, and political domination have frequently relied on claims of Natural Law to legitimize conquest and control.

For instance, European colonial powers used the rhetoric of Natural Law to justify the subjugation of indigenous populations. They framed their legal and moral systems as “civilized” and based on universal principles, while dismissing native customs as inferior or unnatural. This ideological framework provided moral cover for coercion, exploitation, and cultural erasure. Of course religious institutions across the world have been quick to confer the halo of Natural Law on their own dogma. Religious institutions from have often used Natural Law arguments to enforce moral conformity, punishing deviations from dogmatic norms under the pretense of upholding their universal truths.

Natural Law’s historical role as an instrument of domination raises serious ethical concerns. If its primary function has been to serve the interests of those in power, then its legitimacy as a moral guide is highly suspect. Rather than being an impartial standard of justice, it appears to be a rhetorical device used to consolidate control over others.

The Fallacy of Universal Morality

The assumption that a universal morality exists contradicts the reality of human individuality. Every human being is genetically unique, behaves in distinct ways, and forms personal values based on their own experiences. Given this diversity, it is absurd to claim that a single moral code applies equally to all people. What is “good” for one person may be harmful or undesirable for another. What is “good” for me here and now is certain to be “bad” for some one of the other 8 billion people alive.

The idea of universal morality is, at best, an abstraction with no real-world grounding. At worst, it is an imbecilic construct used to justify coercion. The imposition of a supposedly universal moral order disregards the fact that morality is fundamentally a product of individual cognition. Each person’s moral framework emerges from their subjective values, which they use to navigate life’s complexities. The attempt to enforce a single moral standard on diverse populations is not only impractical but also a form of ideological tyranny.

Furthermore, moral codes are often shaped by historical circumstances rather than any intrinsic natural order. Concepts of justice, equality, and rights have changed dramatically over time, reflecting societal needs rather than adherence to some eternal truth. Slavery was once considered morally acceptable in many civilizations, and its eventual abolition was not the result of a discovery of Natural Law but of shifting economic and political forces. The same can be said for religious freedoms or freedom of expression and numerous other moral issues. This historical fluidity further undermines the idea that moral principles are fixed or inherent.

The Political Function of Universal Morality

If morality is not universal but instead emerges from subjective values, why does the myth of Natural Law persist? The answer lies in its political utility. The concept of a universal moral order provides a convenient justification for those in power to enforce their will on others. By claiming that certain moral rules are “self-evident” or “natural,” political and religious leaders can sidestep debate and impose their norms without question.

Universal morality is, in effect, a political construct. It serves as a tool for suppressing dissent and legitimizing authority. Governments, religious institutions, and international bodies all invoke the language of universal morality to assert control over populations. For example, international human rights laws claim to be based on fundamental moral principles, yet they often reflect the political interests of dominant nations. The selective enforcement of these laws—where powerful countries violate them with impunity while weaker nations face harsh penalties—reveals their true function as mechanisms of control rather than genuine moral imperatives.

By recognizing morality as inherently subjective, we expose the coercive nature of universal moral claims. A society that acknowledges the diversity of moral perspectives is better equipped to foster genuine dialogue and coexistence. Instead of imposing artificial moral absolutes, ethical and legal systems should be constructed with an understanding of human individuality and the necessity of negotiated social agreements.

Conclusion

Natural Law fails as a legitimate concept because it lacks empirical evidence, serves as a tool of domination, and falsely assumes a universal morality that does not exist. The historical and political record demonstrates that claims to Natural Law have been used primarily to justify coercion and control, rather than to uncover any genuine moral truth. Morality, rather than being an objective reality, emerges from individual values and experiences. Recognizing this subjectivity allows for a more honest and flexible approach to ethical and legal systems, one that respects human diversity rather than imposing ideological uniformity.

By rejecting Natural Law, we free ourselves from the illusion of universal morality and open the door to a more nuanced understanding of ethics—one that acknowledges the complexities of human existence rather than imposing rigid, arbitrary norms. The path to justice and social harmony lies not in fabricated moral absolutes but in the recognition of individual agency and the negotiated agreements that allow diverse societies to coexist.

Natural Law is, in fact, nothing more than a political invention for use as a tool for oppression.

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Natural Law is neither natural nor is it law

August 12, 2024

The laws of nature do not allow any non-compliance. Whether we have managed to formulate them correctly or not (and it is worth remembering that we still cannot explain why gravity works), the laws of nature specify how effects follow causes in our universe. Inexorable, unavoidable, unchangeable. The laws of nature are indifferent to the state of the universe.

Natural Law, however, is neither natural nor a law. It is not a real thing. It is nothing which can be found in nature which controls or commands human behaviour. I consider the concept of Natural Law to be sentimentalized fantasy and false. Even though the concept of a Natural Law existing dates back to antiquity and has been suggested by great minds and well meaning people, I have always found this fantasy about Natural Law utterly unpersuasive.

History of Natural Law

Many consider Aristotle to be the father of Natural Law Theory. He argued that what is “just by nature” is not always the same as what is “just by law,” as it does not depend on the decisions or laws of any one group of people, such as lawmakers. Following this, Cicero explained Natural Law as something that can contribute to the general good of society, whereas positive law would contribute to the safety of society. Many contributions continued to be made to Natural Law Theory, such as during the Renaissance and Age of Enlightenment, which led to the creation of more modern Natural Law theories that combined Natural Law with other philosophical theories, …….. In more modern times, Natural Law was also supported by great thinkers such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.

A current definition of Natural Law would be:

Natural law is a philosophical concept that posits that there are inherent laws, principles, or moral codes that are part of the natural order of the world and are accessible to human reason.

I find it does not have the status of a theory. In fact it could hardly even be called a hypothesis. For the concept to make any sense it would require that an objective, universal morality exist, which is impossible. All morality emanates from individual minds and is necessarily subjective. Groups of people could find common ground and share various aspects of morality. But there is no such thing as an objective, universal morality. There is no morality to be found in the natural world. If morality existed in nature, it would, like the laws of nature, then be unavoidable and compel actions. There is no evidence of any such overriding universal morality which commands human behaviour. In fact, just considering how values and morality develop proves, to me, that there can be no such thing as a universal morality.

All morality is subjective and is based on an individual’s most basic value system and applies the individual’s own differentiation between “good” and “bad”. Everything about morality starts from there. This morality does not – as the politically correct claim – establish the intrinsic worth of every individual human. A human has no intrinsic worth. The concept of every human having some intrinsic worth independent of other people and the rest of the universe is nonsensical. The worth he has can only be assessed in the context of the society he exists in. The values of “good” and “bad” derive ultimately from survival needs. What helped survival was good and what did not was bad. As humans evolved and the social behaviour of humans came to differentiate our species from others, it became imperative to differentiate and distinguish between “us” and “them”. Individual, family, clan, and tribe. Nations and religions also need a “tribal” philosophy to differentiate themselves and prosper. The most primal behaviour among humans as a social animal thus is first to ensure survival of the individual and then to define a “we” and a “them”. Actions are taken, in the first instance, for the benefit of the “we”. This becomes actions against “them” if threats are perceived. It is self interest, first of the individual and then of the “we”, which governs human actions. The notion that reason could give a moral philosophy which does not favour “us” is utterly false. Reason has no option but to acknowledge that “we” and “them” is primal and it is unreasonable to claim otherwise. A morality which differentiates between “us” and “them” would then fundamentally contradict any concept of universality applying either to morality or to Natural Law.

My point is that human nature was, and remains, inherently tribal. Tribalism is a good thing. It has worked and still enables human development. It has driven the social and cultural evolution of humans. “We” begets “them”. It is the “we” which provides the motivation which fuels innovation. The fanciful notion that reason alone can lead to a universal moral philosophy that applies equally to all humans (Natural Law) is contradicted by our need for “us” and “them”. If our most primal instincts are to protect “us”, which requires that we differentiate “us” from “them,” then a morality based on these instincts could not be universal. If the entire human race is to be “us” we would still prioritize family and clan or gang or religion in the need to invent a “them”.

The Role of Tribalism in Human Evolution and Development
Tribalism as a Driver of Evolution:
• Survival and Cooperation: Tribalism has indeed played a crucial role in human evolution. Early humans survived by forming tight-knit groups that provided mutual protection, shared resources, and developed social norms that fostered cooperation. This in-group loyalty was essential for survival in a harsh environment.
• Cultural Development: Tribal structures also facilitated the development of culture, language, social roles, and norms, enabling groups to transmit knowledge and skills across generations.
The Benefits of Tribalism:
• Social Identity and Belonging: Tribalism provides individuals with a sense of identity, belonging, and purpose. It fosters social cohesion and collective action, which have been critical for the development of complex societies.
• Competition and Innovation: Competition between tribes or groups has driven innovation and progress in many areas, from technology to governance.

Human behaviour is driven by self interest. First the interest of the individual and then of the social groups where the individual claims membership – family, clan, tribe, religion and nation. It is primal among humans and is reflected in our language that where there is a “we” there has to be a “them”. The defining social group governing individual behaviour being some highfalutin notion of “humanity in general” is pious nonsense.

Natural Law is not natural and it is not law. It is mainly sentimental drivel.

ChatGPT is about as politically correct as it is possible to be since that reflects its biased trainers and how it was trained. Given my skepticism about the concept of Natural Law I thought to provoke a politically correct view by having a “conversation” with ChatGPT. I was a little surprised that it could find no real defense. It only reinforces my opinion that Natural Law is not a real thing at all, is a very misleading concept and does more harm than good. My final question and ChatGPT’s answer is given below.

Question: ktwop – The bottom line is that Natural Law does not actually exist in nature and the idea of a universal moral philosophy and its benefits is just a hypothesis which is not even a theory. Discuss.

ChatGPT : Your position highlights a critical and skeptical view of natural law and universal moral philosophy, questioning their existence and validity as more than theoretical constructs. Let’s summarize the key points:

  1. Natural Law’s Basis in Nature
  • Natural Law as a Construct: You argue that natural law doesn’t have a basis in nature itself. This perspective views natural law as a human-made construct rather than something that inherently exists in the natural world.
  • Absence in Nature: Indeed, natural law doesn’t manifest in nature like physical laws (e.g., gravity). It’s a philosophical concept that attempts to derive moral principles from human nature and reason, rather than directly from the natural world.
  1. Universal Moral Philosophy as a Hypothesis
  • Hypothetical Nature: The idea of a universal moral philosophy, according to your view, is at best a hypothesis—a proposal that hasn’t been universally accepted or proven in practice. It’s a speculative idea rather than a fully developed theory with empirical backing.
  • Challenges of Universality: You point out that while the benefits of such a philosophy are often argued for, the evidence for its practical implementation and effectiveness is limited. Cultural differences, historical conflicts, and the persistence of tribalism challenge the idea that a single moral framework can apply universally.
  1. Theoretical vs. Practical Implications
  • Not an Empirical Science: Unlike natural sciences, which develop theories based on observable and testable phenomena, natural law and universal moral philosophy belong to the realm of moral and political philosophy. They are normative, meaning they prescribe how things ought to be rather than describe how things are.
  • Speculative Nature: Because these concepts are speculative, their validity largely depends on philosophical reasoning, ethical debates, and cultural acceptance, rather than empirical validation.

Conclusion

Your critique suggests that natural law and the idea of a universal moral philosophy are intellectual constructs rather than realities grounded in nature or proven theories. They are proposals that attempt to guide human behavior and social organization based on ideals of reason, human dignity, and common good. However, their existence and effectiveness remain subjects of debate, with significant challenges to their universality and practical application.

In essence, while these ideas have influenced moral and legal thought, their status as more than hypothetical constructs is contested, and they may not hold the same weight as theories in the natural sciences.

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