Vaccine worship is almost as bad as anti-vax

October 18, 2020

Anti-vax may be utterly stupid but vaccine worship is not far behind.

Let us not forget the public health fiasco with swine influenza vaccine and narcolepsy. In October 2009, Sweden’s public health services carried out a mass vaccination program against swine influenza. Six million doses of GlaxoSmithKline’s H1N1 influenza vaccine Pandemrix were administered. The vaccine was approved for use by the European Commission in September 2009, upon the recommendations of the European Medicines Agency. By August 2010, both the Swedish Medical Products Agency (MPA) and the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) launched investigations regarding the development of narcolepsy as a side effect.

An increased risk of narcolepsy was found following vaccination with Pandemrix, a monovalent 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine that was used in several European countries during the H1N1 influenza pandemic. This risk was initially found in Finland, and then other European countries also detected an association.

CDC

Today over 400 people of those vaccinated in Sweden suffer from narcolepsy.

Narcolepsy is a central nervous system disorder characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness (EDS) and abnormal manifestations of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This disorder is caused by the brain’s inability to regulate sleep-wake cycles normally. The condition is incurable and life long. Some treatments can help to alleviate symptoms. 

It is the same “experts” and institutions who decided on mass use of Pandemrix who are now inventing public health strategies for Covid-19. Meanwhile a vaccine for the coronavirus is still in its early stages of development and clinical trials. Some of these “expert” strategies are just fairy tales and fantasy.

Vaccinations generally work. Particular vaccinations sometimes don’t. Whether any particular vaccine against Covid-19 will work remains to be seen. The experience with other coronaviruses provides no track record which inspires great confidence.

I get worried when people say they believe in science. To be scientific is to be skeptical. If some science has to be believed in, then whatever it is that has to be believed, is not science.


The substance of leadership lies in behaviour not in style

October 16, 2020

I was recently invited by our local college (gymnasium) to give a lecture about my views on leadership. I was a little surprised that some of the questions were focused on the style of leadership rather than on substance. For example, styles are sometimes classified as being:

  1. empathic or
  2. visionary or
  3. coaching or
  4. commanding or
  5. driving or
  6. democratic.

Without the need for cooperation, the word “leader” is undefined. Without a leader the word “leadership” is undefined. For me, leadership is entirely about behaviour. This classification of styles is not, in fact, about what constitutes leadership or even about different kinds of leadership. It is merely a list of styles which is entirely superficial. It places  an undue emphasis on form rather than on substance; on the cosmetics of what leadership looks like rather than the fundamental behaviour involved. The use of “democratic” as a qualifier for a leadership style merely panders to a fashionable sense of political correctness and is inherently self-contradictory. The behaviour needed for leadership is no different whether in a monarchy or a democracy or a dictatorship.  The behaviour is no different whether in the military or in government or in the corporate world or in sport. 

I prefer my own definition of what a leader is.

“A leader is a person who behaves in such a manner as to induce the necessary behaviour from others, individually and collectively, towards a goal”

With this definition, the various behavioural styles above only describe particular facets of behavioural interactions between a leader and others. A leader has just two functions, which are necessary and sufficient:

  1. To create and establish goals, and
  2. to induce the behaviour necessary from others, individually and collectively, towards those goals.

Behavioural styles of a leader are then, and must be, as varied as may be necessary to induce the required behaviour from others. Depending upon the size of the group involved and their competence, a leader will need to use different styles to motivate and encourage different members. He is the conductor of an orchestra of behaviours. He may have to be a tyrant occasionally, a commander with some, show empathy with others, or be consultative with a few. The style in play may well vary with different leaders and different members. Behavioural style may vary over time or depending upon the prevailing external conditions. The so-called “democratic” style is really a very particular style of behaviour. It is useful, at times, in getting consensus – if consensus is what is needed – when dealing, for example, with an expert group where all members have very high levels of specialized competence. Group members have different roles and can vary widely in competence. A consensus of the incompetent is of no great value. Any leader who generally subordinates his behaviour to the consensus, or to a majority view to determine decisions, effectively abdicates leadership. A “democratic” leadership is inherently contradictory. You can have leadership in a democracy but not democracy within leadership. Any “style” of leadership behaviour must always be subordinated to the primary function of inducing the behaviour necessary from others to achieve a goal.

By considering the two components separately, it becomes much easier not only to assess people for leadership roles but also to tailor education and training to suit particular individuals.

  1. Can the individual envision, create and establish goals? 
  2. Can the individual get the necessary behaviour from others?

It then naturally follows that being visionary and having skills for strategy or planning or forecasting or communication will be beneficial for goal-setting. Similarly, it becomes obvious that people-skills, motivation, communication, inspiration and persuasion are beneficial for getting the required behaviour from others. It is, I have found, counter-productive to over-think and unnecessarily complicate the basic principles. 

Leadership is about the effectiveness of the leader’s behaviour. The empirical evidence of 200,000 years as modern humans is that a group with leadership is more effective than one without. Leadership is a vector quantity with both magnitude and direction. The direction comes from the creation and setting of goals and the magnitude is a measure of the “goodness” of the leadership which, in turn, is a measure of the competence of the leader to induce the required behaviour of others.

I do not claim that leadership is easy. But I do claim that the principles of leadership are simple and straightforward.  A leader must be able to create and establish goals and must then be able to induce the behaviour of others towards those goals. It is complex but it is not more complicated than that.


“What the pandemic has taught us about science” – Matt Ridley

October 14, 2020

Matt Ridley’s article in the Rational Optimist expresses much of my frustration with gullible journalists and the opportunism of the scientific fraternity (where over half are bean counters or clerks and don’t do any science) to exploit every funding opportunity. The money being thrown at Covid-19 research is far too tempting to expect that the charlatans will stay away. More than three hundred different projects being funded for developing a vaccine suggests that either we are so clueless that 300 different paths need to be pursued or that we have a number of fake projects being funded. I am not impressed when projects are funded to “study” how long the virus remains viable on mobile phones as opposed to plastic bags, or when the number of authors on Covid-19 papers are counted and “analysed”.

As Matt Ridley writes:

“…. peer review is often perfunctory rather than thorough; often exploited by chums to help each other; and frequently used by gatekeepers to exclude and extinguish legitimate minority scientific opinions in a field”.

His article is re-blogged here.

What the pandemic has taught us about science – Matt Ridley

The scientific method remains the best way to solve many problems, but bias, overconfidence and politics can sometimes lead scientists astray.

The Covid-19 pandemic has stretched the bond between the public and the scientific profession as never before. Scientists have been revealed to be neither omniscient demigods whose opinions automatically outweigh all political disagreement, nor unscrupulous fraudsters pursuing a political agenda under a cloak of impartiality. Somewhere between the two lies the truth: Science is a flawed and all too human affair, but it can generate timeless truths, and reliable practical guidance, in a way that other approaches cannot.

In a lecture at Cornell University in 1964, the physicist Richard Feynman defined the scientific method. First, you guess, he said, to a ripple of laughter. Then you compute the consequences of your guess. Then you compare those consequences with the evidence from observations or experiments. “If [your guess] disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make a difference how beautiful the guess is, how smart you are, who made the guess or what his name is…it’s wrong.”

So when people started falling ill last winter with a respiratory illness, some scientists guessed that a novel coronavirus was responsible. The evidence proved them right. Some guessed it had come from an animal sold in the Wuhan wildlife market. The evidence proved them wrong. Some guessed vaccines could be developed that would prevent infection. The jury is still out.

Seeing science as a game of guess-and-test clarifies what has been happening these past months. Science is not about pronouncing with certainty on the known facts of the world; it is about exploring the unknown by testing guesses, some of which prove wrong.

Bad practice can corrupt all stages of the process. Some scientists fall so in love with their guesses that they fail to test them against evidence. They just compute the consequences and stop there. Mathematical models are elaborate, formal guesses, and there has been a disturbing tendency in recent years to describe their output with words like data, result or outcome. They are nothing of the sort.

An epidemiological model developed last March at Imperial College London was treated by politicians as hard evidence that without lockdowns, the pandemic could kill 2.2 million Americans, 510,000 Britons and 96,000 Swedes. The Swedes tested the model against the real world and found it wanting: They decided to forgo a lockdown, and fewer than 6,000 have died there.

In general, science is much better at telling you about the past and the present than the future. As Philip Tetlock of the University of Pennsylvania and others have shown, forecasting economic, meteorological or epidemiological events more than a short time ahead continues to prove frustratingly hard, and experts are sometimes worse at it than amateurs, because they overemphasize their pet causal theories.

A second mistake is to gather flawed data. On May 22, the respected medical journals the Lancet and the New England Journal of Medicine published a study based on the medical records of 96,000 patients from 671 hospitals around the world that appeared to disprove the guess that the drug hydroxychloroquine could cure Covid-19. The study caused the World Health Organization to halt trials of the drug.

It then emerged, however, that the database came from Surgisphere, a small company with little track record, few employees and no independent scientific board. When challenged, Surgisphere failed to produce the raw data. The papers were retracted with abject apologies from the journals. Nor has hydroxychloroquine since been proven to work. Uncertainty about it persists.

A third problem is that data can be trustworthy but inadequate. Evidence-based medicine teaches doctors to fully trust only science based on the gold standard of randomized controlled trials. But there have been no randomized controlled trials on the wearing of masks to prevent the spread of respiratory diseases (though one is now under way in Denmark). In the West, unlike in Asia, there were months of disagreement this year about the value of masks, culminating in the somewhat desperate argument of mask foes that people might behave too complacently when wearing them. The scientific consensus is that the evidence is good enough and the inconvenience small enough that we need not wait for absolute certainty before advising people to wear masks.

This is an inverted form of the so-called precautionary principle, which holds that uncertainty about possible hazards is a strong reason to limit or ban new technologies. But the principle cuts both ways. If a course of action is known to be safe and cheap and might help to prevent or cure diseases—like wearing a face mask or taking vitamin D supplements, in the case of Covid-19—then uncertainty is no excuse for not trying it.

A fourth mistake is to gather data that are compatible with your guess but to ignore data that contest it. This is known as confirmation bias. You should test the proposition that all swans are white by looking for black ones, not by finding more white ones. Yet scientists “believe” in their guesses, so they often accumulate evidence compatible with them but discount as aberrations evidence that would falsify them—saying, for example, that black swans in Australia don’t count.

Advocates of competing theories are apt to see the same data in different ways. Last January, Chinese scientists published a genome sequence known as RaTG13 from the virus most closely related to the one that causes Covid-19, isolated from a horseshoe bat in 2013. But there are questions surrounding the data. When the sequence was published, the researchers made no reference to the previous name given to the sample or to the outbreak of illness in 2012 that led to the investigation of the mine where the bat lived. It emerged only in July that the sample had been sequenced in 2017-2018 instead of post-Covid, as originally claimed.

These anomalies have led some scientists, including Dr. Li-Meng Yan, who recently left the University of Hong Kong School of Public Health and is a strong critic of the Chinese government, to claim that the bat virus genome sequence was fabricated to distract attention from the truth that the SARS-CoV-2 virus was actually manufactured from other viruses in a laboratory. These scientists continue to seek evidence, such as a lack of expected bacterial DNA in the supposedly fecal sample, that casts doubt on the official story.

By contrast, Dr. Kristian Andersen of Scripps Research in California has looked at the same confused announcements and stated that he does not “believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible.” Having checked the raw data, he has “no concerns about the overall quality of [the genome of] RaTG13.”

Given that Dr. Andersen’s standing in the scientific world is higher than Dr. Yan’s, much of the media treats Dr. Yan as a crank or conspiracy theorist. Even many of those who think a laboratory leak of the virus causing Covid-19 is possible or likely do not go so far as to claim that a bat virus sequence was fabricated as a distraction. But it is likely that all sides in this debate are succumbing to confirmation bias to some extent, seeking evidence that is compatible with their preferred theory and discounting contradictory evidence.

Dr. Andersen, for instance, has argued that although the virus causing Covid-19 has a “high affinity” for human cell receptors, “computational analyses predict that the interaction is not ideal” and is different from that of SARS, which is “strong evidence that SARS-CoV-2 is not the product of purposeful manipulation.” Yet, even if he is right, many of those who agree the virus is natural would not see this evidence as a slam dunk.

As this example illustrates, one of the hardest questions a science commentator faces is when to take a heretic seriously. It’s tempting for established scientists to use arguments from authority to dismiss reasonable challenges, but not every maverick is a new Galileo. As the astronomer Carl Sagan once put it, “Too much openness and you accept every notion, idea and hypothesis—which is tantamount to knowing nothing. Too much skepticism—especially rejection of new ideas before they are adequately tested—and you’re not only unpleasantly grumpy, but also closed to the advance of science.” In other words, as some wit once put it, don’t be so open-minded that your brains fall out.

Peer review is supposed to be the device that guides us away from unreliable heretics. A scientific result is only reliable when reputable scholars have given it their approval. Dr. Yan’s report has not been peer reviewed. But in recent years, peer review’s reputation has been tarnished by a series of scandals. The Surgisphere study was peer reviewed, as was the study by Dr. Andrew Wakefield, hero of the anti-vaccine movement, claiming that the MMR vaccine (for measles, mumps and rubella) caused autism. Investigations show that peer review is often perfunctory rather than thorough; often exploited by chums to help each other; and frequently used by gatekeepers to exclude and extinguish legitimate minority scientific opinions in a field.

Herbert Ayres, an expert in operations research, summarized the problem well several decades ago: “As a referee of a paper that threatens to disrupt his life, [a professor] is in a conflict-of-interest position, pure and simple. Unless we’re convinced that he, we, and all our friends who referee have integrity in the upper fifth percentile of those who have so far qualified for sainthood, it is beyond naive to believe that censorship does not occur.” Rosalyn Yalow, winner of the Nobel Prize in medicine, was fond of displaying the letter she received in 1955 from the Journal of Clinical Investigation noting that the reviewers were “particularly emphatic in rejecting” her paper.

The health of science depends on tolerating, even encouraging, at least some disagreement. In practice, science is prevented from turning into religion not by asking scientists to challenge their own theories but by getting them to challenge each other, sometimes with gusto. Where science becomes political, as in climate change and Covid-19, this diversity of opinion is sometimes extinguished in the pursuit of a consensus to present to a politician or a press conference, and to deny the oxygen of publicity to cranks. This year has driven home as never before the message that there is no such thing as “the science”; there are different scientific views on how to suppress the virus.

Anthony Fauci, the chief scientific adviser in the U.S., was adamant in the spring that a lockdown was necessary and continues to defend the policy. His equivalent in Sweden, Anders Tegnell, by contrast, had insisted that his country would not impose a formal lockdown and would keep borders, schools, restaurants and fitness centers open while encouraging voluntary social distancing. At first, Dr. Tegnell’s experiment looked foolish as Sweden’s case load increased. Now, with cases low and the Swedish economy in much better health than other countries, he looks wise. Both are good scientists looking at similar evidence, but they came to different conclusions.

Having proved a guess right, scientists must then repeat the experiment. Here too there are problems. A replication crisis has shocked psychology and medicine in recent years, with many scientific conclusions proving impossible to replicate because they were rushed into print with “publication bias” in favor of marginally and accidentally significant results. As the psychologist Stuart Ritchie of Kings College London argues in his new book, “Science Fictions: Exposing Fraud, Bias, Negligence and Hype in Science,” unreliable and even fraudulent papers are now known to lie behind some influential theories.

For example, “priming”—the phenomenon by which people can be induced to behave differently by suggestive words or stimuli—was until recently thought to be a firmly established fact, but studies consistently fail to replicate it. In the famous 1971 Stanford prison experiment, taught to generations of psychology students, role-playing volunteers supposedly chose to behave sadistically toward “prisoners.” Tapes have revealed that the “guards” were actually instructed to behave that way. A widely believed study, subject of a hugely popular TED talk, showing that “power posing” gives you a hormonal boost, cannot be replicated. And a much-publicized discovery that ocean acidification alters fish behavior turned out to be bunk.

Prof. Ritchie argues that the way scientists are funded, published and promoted is corrupting: “Peer review is far from the guarantee of reliability it is cracked up to be, while the system of publication that’s supposed to be a crucial strength of science has become its Achilles heel.” He says that we have “ended up with a scientific system that doesn’t just overlook our human foibles but amplifies them.”

At times, people with great expertise have been humiliated during this pandemic by the way the virus has defied their predictions. Feynman also said: “Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.” But a theoretical physicist can afford such a view; it is not much comfort to an ordinary person trying to stay safe during the pandemic or a politician looking for advice on how to prevent the spread of the virus. Organized science is indeed able to distill sufficient expertise out of debate in such a way as to solve practical problems. It does so imperfectly, and with wrong turns, but it still does so.

How should the public begin to make sense of the flurry of sometimes contradictory scientific views generated by the Covid-19 crisis? There is no shortcut. The only way to be absolutely sure that one scientific pronouncement is reliable and another is not is to examine the evidence yourself. Relying on the reputation of the scientist, or the reporter reporting it, is the way that many of us go, and is better than nothing, but it is not infallible. If in doubt, do your homework.


Sweden: Covid 19 deaths no longer stick out.

October 12, 2020

 As schools and colleges have opened and partying has resumed, the number of infections have been rising.

However the deaths attributed to Covid-19 no longer stick out of the average of deaths/day (all causes).


Why did we start to count?

October 12, 2020

Counting and the invention of numbers and the abstractions enabling mathematics are surely cognitive abilities. Counting itself involves an abstract ability. The simple act of raising two fingers to denote the number of stones or lions or stars implies first, the abstract ability to describe an observed quality and second, the desire to communicate that observation.

What led humans to counting and when?

Before an intelligence can turn to counting it must first have some concept of numbers. When and how did our ancient ancestors  first develop a concept of numbers and then start counting? …….. 

It seems clear that many animals do distinguish – in a primitive and elementary way – between “more” and “less, and “few” and “many”,and “bigger” and “smaller”, and even manage to distinguish between simple number counts. They show a sophisticated use of hierarchy and precedence.

Some primates show some primitive abilities when tested by humans

…..  Rhesus monkeys appear to understand that 1 + 1 = 2. They also seem to understand that 2 + 1 = 3, 2 – 1 = 1, and 3 – 1 = 2—but fail, however, to understand that 2 + 2 = 4. ……

But even chimpanzees and monkeys rarely, if ever, use counts or counting in interactions among themselves. The abilities for language and counting are not necessarily connected genetically (though it is probable), but they are both certainly abilities which appear gradually as cognition increases. Mathematics is, of course, just another language for describing the world around us. Number systems, as all invented languages, need that a system and its rules be shared before any communication is feasible. It is very likely that the expressions of the abilities to count and to have language follow much the same timeline. The invention of specific sounds or gestures to signify words surely coincided with the invention of gestures or sounds to signify numbers. The step change in the size of brains along the evolutionary path of humans is very likely closely connected with the expressions of the language and the counting abilities.

The ability to have language surely preceded the invention of languages just as the ability to count preceded the expressions of counting and numbering. It is not implausible that the first member of a homo erectus descendant who used his fingers to indicate one of something, or four of something else, to one of his peers, made a far, far greater discovery – relatively – than Newton or Einstein ever did.

We must have started counting and using counts (using gestures) long before we invented words to represent counts. Of course, it is the desire to communicate which is the driving force which takes us from having abilities to expressions of those abilities. The “cooperation gene” goes back to before the development of bipedalism and before the split with chimpanzees or even gorillas (at least 9 million years ago).

The simple answer to the question “Why did we start to count?” is because we could conceive of a count, observed it and wished to communicate it. But this presupposes the ability to count. Just as with language, the ability and the expression of the ability, are a consequence of the rapid increase in brain size which happened between 3 m and 1 m years ago.

I am persuaded that that rapid change was due to the control of fire and the change to eating cooked food and especially cooked meat. The digestion of many nutrients becomes possible only with cooked food and is the most plausible driver for the rapid increase in brain size.

Raw Food not enough to feed big brains

………. our brains would still be the size of an ape’s if H. erectus hadn’t played with fire: “Gorillas are stuck with this limitation of how much they can eat in a day; orangutans are stuck there; H. erectus would be stuck there if they had not invented cooking,” she says. “The more I think about it, the more I bow to my kitchen. It’s the reason we are here.”


Courage! Science (and bean-counters) cannot control the pandemic

October 7, 2020

Ten months on and I keep hearing the inane slogan “Follow the science”. But the best medical advice is floundering and is still no more than the basic common sense advice of “avoid being infected”. The simple reality is that the best our current science has to offer was unable to prevent the pandemic and is unable to curtail it or bring it under control. The Covid-19 virus cannot, at least for now, be eradicated.

While the medical fraternity is doing great things in treating those infected and is expending enormous money and energy in finding a vaccine, the epidemiological fraternity has failed spectacularly in both preventing the pandemic and in controlling or curtailing the pandemic. But more damaging is the illusion they promote that they are in control. Pretending you can when you cannot is bordering on gross negligence. Essentially they have nothing more to offer than the best advice available at the time of the Black Death almost 700 years ago.

I begin to suspect that epidemiology is more about bean-counting than about science. The political process which has relied on these bean-counters has vacillated between cowardice and courage.


A matter of perspective

October 5, 2020

The view depends not upon the reflected light signals being detected but on the brain interpreting those signals.

There are those who prefer to live in fear and can only see a glass half-empty and emptying fast. They see insurmountable problems in every challenge.

There are others who see an opportunity in every obstacle and the space available to fill a glass half-full. They see a challenge in every problem.


100 years after the Spanish flu, virology still has far to go

October 4, 2020

Medical science does wonders. From amazing surgical procedures to an incredible variety of drugs and a fantastic array of tools and equipment, medicine, as it is practiced today, is light years ahead of where it was in 1918 at the time of the Spanish flu. Yet, medical science has not been capable of quickly defeating the current Wuhan virus pandemic. Health care has improved beyond recognition. Compared to 100 years ago, health services can deploy a bewildering variety of drugs and equipment and therapies to treat the infected.

The effects of the current pandemic are most often compared with the effects of the Spanish flu in 1918. The flu virus was identified in 1933 and the first flu vaccine came out in 1942. However, even today the flu vaccine is thought to be effective only in a little over 50% of cases. It is estimated that the Spanish flu, over a period of 3 years killed between 25 and 39 million people and that about 500 million were infected when the global population was only about 1,800 million. Today with a global population of 7, 200 million it is estimated that at least 35 million have been infected and, so far, over 1 million are thought to have died. The pandemic has lasted 6 months and is still ongoing. The virus was identified very quickly – perhaps one month – but only after the data repressed by the Chinese government and the WHO – leaked out.

The hunt for a vaccine is only 6 months old. There are at least 300 groups actively searching for one. Around 30 proposed vaccines have entered some kind of clinical trials. Estimates of when a vaccine could be readily available range from 6 months to 2 years to never. Money is being thrown at vaccine development at unprecedented levels. Certainly some of the groups chasing a vaccine have zero chance of success but cannot resist the temptation of huge amounts of easy money.

But virology is far from a settled science. In fact, there is still debate on whether a virus is living or not. That there are 300 different groups seeking a vaccine is, itself, evidence of 300 different opinions. During the past 6 months a bewildering variety of suggestions have been made for prophylactics, remedies and cures. Every single one has come from a “medical specialist”. The best advice is still “avoid infection” (by social distancing and masks which may or may not work), and hope. There are no preventive drugs and there are no cures (beyond treating symptoms). If and when vaccines are found, they will vary in how effective they are. Estimates of how expensive a vaccine may be range from 30$ to 300$ per dose for either a one-dose or a two-dose vaccine, with immunity available for periods ranging from 3 months to 1 year after vaccination.

Everyday new “experts” are trotted out on TV. But the science is not settled and there are no experts. The simple reality is that compared to 100 years ago, this pandemic has medical science just as stymied as the Spanish flu did – but at a very much higher level of knowledge.


Indian monsoon defies Covid 19 and climate change – stays normal

October 1, 2020

The monsoon season (1st June – 30th September) in India is over.

Total rainfall (957.7mm) was 8.7% above the long term average (1961 – 2010) which counts as being normal (+/- 10%).

It does not seem to have been affected by Covid 19, the US election, or alleged man-made climate change.


 

History is a variable

September 30, 2020

Why do so many spend so much time in rewriting history?

Because, of course, history is not the immutable past but only ever a story. And rewriting and retelling stories to suit our current purposes is what we do.

Present misery is compensated for by wallowing in stories of past glories. Present failures are blamed on stories of past oppression. Present incompetence is attributed to stories of past suffering. Present stupidity is excused by stories of past undernourishment. Present duplicity is defended by stories of past exploitation. Present criminality is justified by stories of past deprivation. Present depravity is condoned by stories of past repression.


 


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