Archive for January, 2026

Both Venezuela and Greenland are part of the Great US-China Game

January 20, 2026

I have been amazed at the stupidity of the European response to Trump’s rhetoric about Greenland. They seem to have no clue as to the game that is being played. While Trump is negotiating they are reacting to tactics and red herrings and have no idea what the end goal is and even which game is being played. It is not that Trump is conferring idiocy upon the clueless European leaders – they have been self-harming themselves!

For the US (Trump) the motive in both regions is not personal pique or detest for Maduro. It is not either about resources for just their own sake.  This is part of the Great Game between the US and China for the coming 100 years. It is about strategic leverage against China’s growing global footprint. That is the thread tying them together. In another century it was the Great Britain and Russia. The US and China are taking the Great Game to new regions. The serious geo-political analysts see it. I am afraid that the European leaders get bogged down and utterly distracted by Trump’s injection of red herrings which they just cannot discern.


Venezuela – Yes oil but not only oil

Venezuela’s primary strategic value is its natural resources, above all oil. It has the world’s largest proven oil reserves. The recent U.S. intervention and pressure campaign explicitly cites oil access and disruption of adversarial influence as motives.

  1. China has deep financial and commercial ties with Venezuela, long providing loans and buying Venezuelan energy and commodities.
  2. Venezuelan rare earths and critical minerals are potential future assets — but currently underdeveloped, lacking infrastructure and clear exploitation plans.

The U.S. objectives are no secret and have been discussed so openly that I wonder why reporters of the lower kind and one-note politicians so easily forget.

  1. Deny China Easy Access to Resources
    Even if Venezuela isn’t a top rare-earth producer today, Washington sees value in preventing Beijing from locking up any potential resources or influence that could reduce U.S. leverage. This jibes with official U.S. rhetoric about countering “non-hemispheric competitors.”
  2. Break China’s Growing Footprint in the Region
    Latin America isn’t neutral territory anymore. China is a major trading partner across many states, and U.S. strategy now frames this as a geostrategic threat – something that could give Beijing leverage deep in the Western Hemisphere.
  3. Strategic Oil Supply and Energy Security
    Oil still matters as base strategic power: controlling Venezuelan oil limits Beijing’s access to energy markets, which could constrain China’s industrial or military trajectory in a crisis.
  4. Supply Chain & Rare Earth Sentiment
    Some U.S. policy thinkers argue the future of tech and defence depends on diversifying supply chains away from China – and Venezuela’s minerals could play into that if infrastructure and political stability were achieved.

My assessment is that the U.S. wants to disrupt Chinese access. This fits with how Washington/Rubio/Trump are now framing their moves. This is a long-term geo-political play about material resources and influence. A not insignificant part is the rare earths  potential in Venezuela even if they are not yet a fully realized asset.

Greenland: Raw Materials and Strategic Geography

Greenland doesn’t fit exactly the same profile as Venezuela, but it does fit the same pattern. It is about access to strategic resources and a denial of geo-political access to China. Greenland hosts some of the richest deposits of rare earth elements outside China. U.S. strategic planners see this as a way — someday — to dilute China’s dominance in critical raw materials that power everything from electric vehicles to missiles. Besides minerals, Greenland is a gateway to the Arctic — territory increasingly contested by Russia and China. U.S. military interest there reflects broader strategic positioning. Rather than wait for China (or Russia) to embed itself economically or militarily, the U.S. has pushed aggressive diplomacy, investment deals, and even territorial rhetoric, explicitly meant to keep rival influence out.

Extracting rare earths in Greenland is currently expensive, technically difficult, and far from market scale. Greenland’s harsh climate and lack of infrastructure make mining a long-term project. But from a strategic viewpoint, that doesn’t matter much — the U.S. wants to lock in preferential access and preclude China from doing so first.


The Great Game: supply chain security 

Both cases tie into a bigger story about critical minerals, supply chains, and great-power competition:

  1. China still controls a vast share of refining and processing for rare earths and other minerals, not just mining.

  2. The U.S. has made securing alternative sources, both domestic and allied, a declared priority, often written and described in the language of national security.

  3. Latin America and the Arctic are the competitive regions for the next century where access to resources and influence matters as much as traditional military positioning.

  4. Within the next century new off-Earth regions of supply chain competition and security will be opening up with the moon (China present and US playing catch-up) and Mars (US first) already included within strategic planning

This not about gestures and virtue signalling and personal pique. It is plain and simple geopolitics.

Who is going to have control of critical raw materials and whose military or economic reach will have dominance in key regions?

That is the game being played not whether the Peace Prize can be legally shared or not!!


Afterword

U.S. actions in Venezuela and Greenland are partly about denying China access to strategic resources and partly about securing their own access:

  • Venezuela: important for oil access and preventing Chinese economic dominance in the hemisphere; rare earths are a secondary but growing part of that calculus.

  • Greenland: a long-range bet on critical materials, strategic geography, and preemptive advantage over China and Russia.

This is part of the Great Game between the US and China for the coming 100 years. It is about strategic leverage against China’s growing global footprint. That is the thread tying Venezuela and Greenland together.


Strategic Importance of Greenland | SOF News


Machado v. the Nobel Committee: When Branding Overreaches Ownership

January 17, 2026

(I dislike the Nobel Peace Prize as being all about politics and being inherently inimical to peace. The Norwegian Nobel Committee are also too woke, self-righteous and sanctimonious for my liking. Too many of the awards are just plain ridiculous and entirely statements of political correctness. But this flurry of stupidity caught my attention this week).


In the wake of María Corina Machado’s decision this week (January 15, 2026) to “present” her 2025 Nobel Peace Prize medal to Donald Trump in the Oval Office, we have witnessed the faintly ridiculous spectacle of a venerable (though somewhat senile) institution getting defensive and huffy about a gift it no longer owns.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee (NC) has responded with a flurry of “cease and desist” style public relations, reminding the world that the prize “cannot be transferred, shared, or revoked.” But in their rush to protect the “Nobel” brand, the Committee is entering the world of nonsense with a legal and logical absurdity.

The Myth of Permanent Authority

The NC’s central argument is that the award and the laureate are “inseparable.” They contend that while Machado can physically hand over the gold, the status of being the 2025 winner remains hers “for all time.”

But this is where the logic fails:

  1. The Right to Award vs. the Right to Own: The NC owns the right to select the winner. Once that choice is made and the physical assets (the medal, the diploma, the money) are handed over, the ownership of the prize, practically and legally, shifts to the recipient.
  2. The Power of Words: If Machado stands in the White House and says, “I share this with you,” she is not usurping the NC’s authority to grant awards. She is exercising her right as an owner to define the meaning of her property.
  3. The Record vs. Reality: The NC can keep their Register of Laureates in Oslo however they like, but they have no legal authority over how a laureate interprets their own achievement in the public square.

Defensive Branding or Political Insecurity?

The sheer vehemence of the NC’s recent press releases is counterproductive. By issuing multiple statements within a single week, the Committee suggests that their 2025 decision is so fragile that it requires constant shielding from the “wrong” people.

When an institution shouts this loudly about why someone isn’t a winner, it stops sounding like a defense of history and starts sounding like a defensive reaction to current politics. If the award is truly “final and stands for all time,” why does the Committee feel the need to argue with a photo-op?

The “Law is an Ass” Problem

To claim that a recipient cannot “share” the honour of their work is to treat the Nobel Prize like a lease rather than a gift. In any other legal context, once a gift is given, the giver loses the right to dictate its subsequent use or interpretation.

By insisting that Machado cannot “transfer” the sentiment of the prize, the NC is trying to police the thoughts and associations of its laureates. They are essentially saying: “We gave you this, but we still control what it means.”

Conclusion

The Nobel Committee would do well to remember that their prestige should come from the merit of their choices (not very impressive lately) and not from their ability to act as a “history monitor.” María Corina Machado can give her medal to whomever she chooses. Donald Trump can claim he “has” a Nobel. The NC can keep their books in Oslo. But when the Committee tries to assert “authority” over a laureate’s personal property and public statements, they aren’t protecting the brand. They are just confirming that, sometimes, the law (and the institution) can be an ass.


How to fold a UN flag

January 8, 2026

I do like this one.

The UN is not fit for purpose and needs to be disbanded.

Credit to : https://x.com/degenJambo/status/2009059463475716245?s=20